Big Brother has shaken European media audiences in the past year. The originally Dutch Endemol format combines television and Internet in a three-month daily surveillance of a group of people living in an ordinary house. Broadcast for the first time in the Netherlands in the fall of 1999, the programme is as huge a hit as a controversy. Even before Big Brother could actually be watched, surprise, embarrassment and outrage dominated among the Dutch cultural, journalistic and scientific vanguard. The unseemly exhibitionism of participants, as well as the shameless voyeurism on the part of viewers and the ruthless exploitation of ordinary people by the Endemol company were at the core of the debate. The idea of spying on people 24 hours a day with 24 cameras, and of releasing those pictures to the nation was widely seen as a low point in Dutch television history and could, according to observers, lead to irreparable psychological damage to participants. Hard on the heels of the first transmission, critics fell over one another; this time to exclaim how tedious the programme and the participants really were. However, along the way, Big Brother won over one sceptic after another, culminating in the programme gaining the status of the foremost innovation in the history of Dutch television. Widely lauded instead of spurned like a half-year earlier, John de Mol who invented, developed and produced the programme was voted Dutch Broadcast Man of the Year 1999 by a jury of professionals.
overall 25 percent for. Kanaal 2 in Belgium scored 32 percent for consecutive episodes. In Portugal the introduction of Big Brother on TV1 attracted 41 percent of the viewers. The Internet figures are even more impressive: overall the first Dutch run of Big Brother drew more than 52 million page views. The German Big Brother site received an average of 3.5 million visitors a day during the first run peaking at 5 million on some days, making it the most visited web site in Europe. The US Big Brother web site was America Online's best visited one last summer (all figures from www.endemol.com/news). If one types in 'Big Brother' and 'house' and 'television' (to prevent the Orwellian meaning) into an ordinary search engine on the Internet, at present one receives some 200,000 sites.
Amid all the moral to-do about Big Brother -John de Mol has repeatedly had to explain to journalists where he 'draws the line' -the far more interesting question why Big Brother was so immensely successful has less frequently been asked (e.g. Mikos et al., 2000; Weber 2000) . A simple accumulation of individual and collective motives why people watch Big Brother will not in this instance suffice; the impact of the show was too big, too sudden and too widespread for that. Big Brother didn't just appeal to untold numbers of individual viewers; it somehow struck a social chord, a subconscious collective yearning, a deep-rooted invisible need. But what precisely was that yearning? On what was that need based? And will spin-offs of Big Brother meet that need in a similar way and to the same extent? That is the subject of this Commentary.
1

Division
The Dutch public debate on Big Brother provides a first key to understanding the collective desires and needs awakened by the programme. Most arguments rest on the division between 'public life' and 'private domain', and the premise that this divide is self-evident and worth nurturing. Big Brother transcended this dichotomy by turning the private lives of ordinary people, with all their normal, everyday, seemingly unimportant experiences and worries into a daily public spectacle. Something similar had already transpired in previous popular formats of Endemol Entertainment such as All You Need is Love, Forgive Me, Soundmix Show, Honeymoon Quiz and Now or Never, all formats originating in the Netherlands and exported to various, mainly European countries.
2
Big Brother built on the trademark of EndeMol enterprises: primal experiences and emotions ('basic instincts' as it were) of ordinary people lie at the heart of hundreds of successful formats. Each of those formats has been subjected to similar criticism: one does not flaunt private emotions, nor does one relish observing another's private emotions. You don't hang out your dirty linen in public, or even, in fact, your clean linen.
3 A quote from a journalist commenting on All You Need is Love provides an example:
Producers, when thus questioned, will always claim to be a psychotherapist or hedge-preacher, disseminating good for aught. Yet how is it that this does not occur through impressive programmes, but rather through a seamy exploitation of emotions, both in participants and in viewers? This is all about unwanted intimacies, the screening whereof some will admit is their last resort and because they can't come up with anything better. (Verdonck, 1993) The fact that the public debate about Big Brother and its predecessors is so often conducted in the terms of public and private and their attendant (unwritten) codes of behaviour seems to suggest that this division is deeply rooted in our society. At the same time, however, the mass-appeal of Big Brother points to the fact that the moral strength of public and private codes is limited: average viewers seem wholly unaffected.
This paradox finds its origin in the history of the private sphere. The intimate domesticity that we associate with it nowadays is a relatively recent phenomenon. In pre-modern societies the private sphere did not yet occur as a separate domain. For the common people, the public realm of production and labour, and the private realm of consumption and care were linked in the small social and economic units households formed at that time. The private lives of the aristocracy did not have an independent character either, but were part of a more general display of status and power. At the pre-revolutionary French court the retiring to bed (le coucher) and the waking up (le lever) of the monarch were daily public affairs to which it was a great privilege being invited as a witness (Elias, 1997) . A private life that distinguished itself by separation from the outside world and by specific experiences and codes of behaviour that were different from the public realm did not, then, exist: neither for the commoner, nor for the social elites. Only the emergence of the bourgeoisie, industrialization and urbanization, presented 'modern' relations wherein a private domain with specific social functions and relevance came into being. The puritan ideology of the Victorian era, following earlier romantic thinkers like Rousseau, promoted the private sphere as a 'haven in a heartless world', best left to the mastery of women. Counterclaims, inspired by Marx and Engels, that the private realm was much more a capitalist invention aimed at the cheap reproduction of the labour force on the backs of womankind (Zaretsky, 1977) found little support.
Private and public spheres gained momentum and imposed their own codes of conduct: rationale and restraint belonged to the public realm, then populated by men; emotions and spontaneity belonged in the private sphere, the 'natural' domain of women. This did not mean that public life had become the domain of all men; on the contrary, labourers and blacks did not qualify because of their supposed inferior powers of reason and judgement. The separation of private and public had thus also become a hierarchy by means of which the white male bourgeoisie created and mantained its own privileges: at first via countless legal mechanisms of exclusion, such as the census and male suffrage, and later in cultural prescriptions for acceptable themes, styles and behaviour in public life (see also Bourdieu, 1979; Calhoun, 1992; Habermas, 1989) .
Resistance
Resistance against this historical division of private and public has up to now found expression mostly in the form of feminist action. The solitary confinement to the private sphere, to which women felt subjected, led to a widespread feminist movement that succeeded in putting numerous subjects which were deemed 'merely' personal on the public, political agenda (Van Zoonen, 1991) . The aim of the feminist and other social movements was initially not only to turn the bourgeois division between the private and the public into a political issue, but to break open those frontiers in everyday life as well. Communes thus blossomed, wherein living, working and private existence were tentatively integrated. These and similar experiments, however, never found broad appeal, and nowadays even among former initiators fatigue and disillusionment have crept in. This does not, however, mean that the bourgeois split between private and public has prevailed and serves as an acceptable and pleasant modus of everyday vivendi to general satisfaction. Sooner, the conclusion should be that the means of the feminist and subcultural alternative were not met with mass acceptance. Big Brother's success however proves, with wider popularity than has feminism, that the bourgeois division between the public domain, with its concomitant regulations, and the private with its own code of conduct is not widely accepted or appreciated, and has moreover lost its social functionality. The comments on Big Brother by the 17-yearold fan and publicist Anna Woltz point in that direction very clearly indeed:
If I could see what my sister is like with her girlfriends, how the maths teacher talks to his wife, how my parents behave among adults, I would not feel the need for a substitute for life. But I don't see all that. How do you learn how to read people if you only know three kinds: kids your age, teachers and parents? . . . Big Brother is the only programme we watch and discuss every day with the whole family. At last, we have 'common' friends, about whom we can talk, think and gossip. (Woltz, 1999) Evidently the 'real' adults in Woltz's environment no longer offer such frames of reference, or not to the extent required, because they have all withdrawn into their own private surroundings, and do not show the world outside what is wrong (or right) or how to deal with it. This is, after all, what is proscribed by the bourgeois codes of conduct for private and public life.
Desire
Television in general has contributed in a great many ways to disclosing the private realm hidden by bourgeois mores. We rediscover on television what has become ever more invisible in the world around us, to wit, the private life of ordinary people: initially mostly in the enacted fantasies of sitcoms and soaps, but currently in a variety of formats in which real life is shown: talk shows, reality-TV, emo-TV, docusoaps and now Big Brother. The obvious comment that such reality genres are just as subject to the laws of television and are manipulated in countless ways by the makers (casting, editing, stage-management, etc.) does not undermine such an observation. The classic adage by W.H. Thomas rings true here: 'If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences ' (in McQuail, 1983) . The unabashedly vociferous use of mobile phones for private conversations in public areas, the 24/7 Internet observation people with web-cams and -sites subject themselves to, the vast numbers of people wishing to participate in talk shows, all these are opportunities people have seized to throw off the bourgeois bodice of the private-public divide. There is obviously an enormous desire to make one's private life public; not because of a vain longing for '15 minutes of fame', as the critics invariably parrot Andy Warhol; not as a result of the supposed unscrupulous machinations by TV-producers such as John de Mol; and certainly not as a consequence of a somehow underdeveloped set of standards and excessive exhibitionism. This sooner tells of a nostalgic yearning for authenticity, for ties with others like oneself, for familiarity and communality, and for the social legitimization of one's own private experiences. Such yearning is not appeased by regular 'culture' (understood as 'Art' with a capital A). After all, art does not deal with the ordinary, the everyday, but with the exceptional. Neither is it smoothened by regular culture (now understood as 'civilization') that dictates that private life remains excluded from society and publicity.
Popular culture thus fills a vacuum left open by 'Art' and 'civilization' (see Van Zoonen, 1999) . Where else than a unique co-production of the dating shows All You Need Is Love and Love Letters could a lesbian couple solemnize their marriage rituals in public before Dutch law offered that opportunity? Or, as the German newspaper Die Zeit wrote: 'John de Mol's programmes are time and again attempts to re-enact old rituals, to bring them closer to the public and to take up their serious substance, their cultural meaning into the mould of television entertainment and reinstating them in the process ' (Minkmar, 2000) . Where else other than in assorted talk shows supposedly private, everyday experiences ranging from 'my husband beats me' to 'my wife doesn't understand me' acquire airtime. And where else than in Big Brother could 17-year-old Anna Woltz and the rest of Holland observe how people in their daily life exchange, adjust and reposition their own stories big and small, their feelings, peeves and thoughts. On top of that, this was not only to be seen in Big Brother, viewers could also comment in public and get involved in the show via the official and numerous unofficial Big Brother websites; an activity often undertaken both with enthusiasm as well as with criticism and hostility. Precisely because of this widespread yearning for collective everyday experiences no longer available in bourgeois society with its sequestered private domain, it is not surprising that participants in Big Brother are so incredibly average, bordering sometimes on the tedious. That seems, in fact, to be the essential core of Big Brother-mania.
The combination of television and Internet in Big Brother has created a collective experience characterized by a desire for everyday communality and by a rebellion against the norms of 'civilized' public culture. That desire, not provoked by exceptional events like a skating marathon, a royal wedding, a disaster of national proportions or a soccer championship, but rooted in ordinary daily humdrum experience, forms the basis of Big Brother's success. It springs from the contemporary bourgeois division between a private realm and a public realm that has isolated private life, marginalized it and made it invisible. Feminism and Big Brother share their resistance against that division. It is consequentially not surprising that both do well with women (in the Dutch situation at least).
Spin-offs
The moment the widely shared desire for everyday recognizability became explicit through the success of Big Brother, spin-offs followed thick and fast, in the first place from the Endemol company itself. John de Mol appointed two full-time staff solely to develop Big Brother varieties ( Van der Heijden, 2000) . A Dutch executive of SBS, a channel that initially rejected Big Brother because it deemed the concept too extreme, ordered a spin-off even before the first series ended. John de Mol Productions churned out The Bus and Chained for SBS at breakneck speed, and The Girls of 5 for Net5 (via 625 Productions, with whom Endemol maintains tight links). Following Big Brother's conquest of Europe these formats have been exported easily and widely as well. Other producers are desperately asking around for formats that suit this demand, something that occasionally leads to hilarious capers such as the order that reached a Dutch producer to devise something positioned 'in-between Who Wants to be a Millionaire and Big Brother' (De Winter, 2000) .
The market for everyday recognizability, created by and with Big Brother is now becoming specialized and diversified toward particular target groups which will pull into focus what exactly constitutes the collective desire for everyday familiarity that Big Brother awakened. Furthermore, the ever-greater diversity of the supply will change demand as well: everyday recognizability will one day be easily available. Demand will not diminish because of this -although John de Mol expects the Big Brother format itself to be exhausted in some four years time (De Mol, 2000) -but rather become more varied and specific. A glimpse of this can be gleaned when we contrast Big Brother with its earliest spin-off, The Bus. This comparison will also show that the nature of the desire for collective everyday experiences and the implicit resistance against the conventions of public life are far from uniform.
A Dutch case
The Bus differs in many ways from Big Brother. Eleven passengers take a 16-week journey through the Netherlands in a double-decker bus. Some of the passengers have to find work during the week, to earn money for food, while the rest stay in or around The Bus. Viewers can vote for their favourite passenger at any time of the day or night, and each week a rankings list is produced. The most popular passenger, along with a fellow passenger of his or her choice, wins four hours of freedom from The Bus, with 1000 guilders to split between them. Once every two weeks, one of the three least popular passengers is required to leave The Bus. The decision is made by the other passengers. After four months have passed, only three passengers remain and viewers decide who will take the jackpot.
Comparing the Dutch first series of Big Brother and The Bus, one looks at a list of oppositions remarkably similar to the differences usually associated with the 'modern' and 'postmodern'. One important contrast between Big Brother and The Bus is that of the fixed location versus the travelling bus; the predictable, unchanging and impenetrable environment of the Big Brother house against the unpredictable and contingent issues of the bus ride. An important difference was found in the participants of the first series: Big Brother's were all white and middle-class, Bus passengers included a second-generation immigrant and a dockworker. Big Brother participants were much more subdued than Bus passengers, who were so outrageous in their behaviour that the broadcasting channel had at some point to mete out 'yellow cards'. These characteristics in turn led to a contrast in the 'narrative', which in Big Brother was harmonious, almost bland; while in The Bus fights and conflicts spilled from the screen, especially in the beginning. In the Big Brother house, mutual liaisons acquired the character of family ties, with one of the women as the presiding mother; in The Bus networks were ever shifting. Where treason was extraneous in Big Brother (participants were voted out by the audience), fellow passengers delivered the coup-de-grace in The Bus.
Thinking of Big Brother and The Bus in metaphors and metonymies for 'modern' and 'postmodern' society highlights the different desires evoked by these formats. The hermetic, self-involved house can be seen as a metaphor for the modern nation-state with its clearly drawn borders and coherent group of citizens, whereas the ever-travelling bus with consistent interference from outside provides a metaphor for postmodern nomadic existence in which migration and expulsion predominate (the bus of The Bus was thrown out of one of the cities it visited). The white, relatively homogeneous and harmonious group of residents of the house figures as a metonymy for pre-migration modern Dutch society, 4 while the 'Bussengers', with their diverse ethnic and class backgrounds, can be seen as functioning metonymically for contemporary multicultural Dutch society. Interestingly, those differences came about rather coincidentally: the extremely temperate, 'well-behaved' casting of the first Big Brother series in the Netherlands was the result of all the commotion and criticism the programme generated in advance. The initial concept called for more divergent and extreme characters, but in an attempt to avoid the calamities the critics predicted would result from this experimentation with human nature, producers opted for a more stable and moderate cast. When it became clear in the course of the programme that the participants did not experience psychological damage, John de Mol effortlessly met SBS's request for The Bus to have more contrast and conflict built into the casting. Furthermore SBS wanted to see The Bus reflect their supposed average viewer. The final selection of candidates for The Bus was made by the audience, which had been asked in several preliminaries to vote for a candidate by telephone polling. The combination of these factors led to a company of 'Bussengers' that represented contemporary multicultural society more accurately than the Big Brother group. The mobility of The Bus came about fortuitously too. John de Mol did not want to comply with the wishes of SBS to make something that paralleled the original Big Brother concept as closely as possible -after all, one isn't a cannibal in one's own house -and thus something radically different from a house emerged: a moving bus (De Mol, 2000) .
5
Through a conjunction of production circumstances then, Big Brother and The Bus became the exponents of a collective desire for respectively 'modern' and 'postmodern' everyday familiarity. As a result, we can interpret the enormous popularity of the first Dutch Big Brother as an expression of a widely shared yearning for an organized, coherent and predictable society, not disturbed by 'Others' or by irrational conflicts and outbursts. Those who do not conform to the 'normal' order are mercilessly expelled (overly out-going women were mercilessly thrown out by the audience). Consensus and harmony rule over opposition and conflict. That is a society that no longer exists, and perhaps the Big Brother feeling should be primarily characterized as nostalgia. It was inevitable that The Bus would not become as popular as Big Brother: spin-offs invariably perform less well than the original format (see Gitlin, 1983) . Beyond that, however, the longing for collective everyday postmodern multicultural, unpredictable and contradictory experience, is evidently less prominent and less acute than the nostalgia for modern orderedness. Yet postmodern society is not spurned altogether, judging by the public's choice for a greater diversity of participants and by the success of The Bus; incomparable to that of Big Brother but scoring well in terms of its time-slot and its target audience.
In conclusion
We will never entirely know what went on with Big Brother. Each explanation for such an expansive phenomenon can only be partial. My analysis which focuses on the resistance against the hegemony of the bourgeois public private division and its conventions, and on the desire for recognition -in both senses of the word -of everyday modern experiences, also only covers part of the story. I have not, for instance, looked at how programming decisions may have helped to expand Big Brother's popularity. In the UK, for instance, as in the US, the programme was scheduled in the slow summer season, with television offerings and news agendas at a low. Disclaimers are possible for both 'desire' and 'resistance'. The longing for everyday familiarity does not only result in pleasurable nostalgia, if one takes the line of a Dutch columnist: 'The programme is the embodiment of the Dutch nightmare. . . . After a mere few days you are convinced: hell is not the other, not the outside world, hell is yourself' (Heijne, 1999) . Other examples of the unpleasant side of the everyday were found in great numbers on the Internet, where Big Brother was not only a source of intense identification for several participants, but also of deep revulsion for others. Identification and revulsion are, however, both sides of the same coin of collective recognition, and the unforeseen success of Big Brother shows that our ordinary, invisible private lives no longer provide enough points of reference for these. Besides, the success of Big Brother can be seen, as discussed earlier, as a form of rebellion against the conventions of
